Efficient Cyber Attacks Detection in Industrial Control Systems Using
  Lightweight Neural Networks and PCA by Kravchik, Moshe & Shabtai, Asaf
1Efficient Cyber Attack Detection in Industrial
Control Systems Using Lightweight Neural
Networks and PCA
Moshe Kravchik and Asaf Shabtai
Abstract—Industrial control systems (ICSs) are widely used
and vital to industry and society. Their failure can have severe
impact on both economics and human life. Hence, these systems
have become an attractive target for attacks, both physical
and cyber. A number of attack detection methods have been
proposed, however they are characterized by a low detection
rate, a substantial false positive rate, or are system specific. In
this paper, we study an attack detection method based on simple
and lightweight neural networks, namely, 1D convolutions and
autoencoders. We apply these networks to both the time and
frequency domains of the collected data and discuss pros and cons
of each approach. We evaluate the suggested method on three
popular public datasets and achieve detection rates matching or
exceeding previously published detection results, while featuring
small footprint, short training and detection times, and generality.
We also demonstrate the effectiveness of PCA, which, given
proper data preprocessing and feature selection, can provide high
attack detection scores in many settings. Finally, we study the
proposed method’s robustness against adversarial attacks, that
exploit inherent blind spots of neural networks to evade detection
while achieving their intended physical effect. Our results show
that the proposed method is robust to such evasion attacks: in
order to evade detection, the attacker is forced to sacrifice the
desired physical impact on the system. This finding suggests that
neural networks trained under the constraints of the laws of
physics can be trusted more than networks trained under more
flexible conditions.
Index Terms—Anomaly detection; Industrial control systems;
convolutional neural networks; autoencoders; frequency analysis;
explainability; adversarial machine learning; adversarial robust-
ness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICSs), also known as supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, combine
distributed computing with physical process monitoring and
control. They are comprised of elements providing feedback
from the physical world (sensors), elements influencing it (actu-
ators), as well as computers and controller networks that process
the feedback data and issue commands to the actuators. Many
ICSs are safety-critical, and an attack interfering with their
functionality can cause substantial financial and environmental
harm, and endanger people’s lives.
The importance of ICSs makes them an attractive target for
attacks, particularly cyber attacks. Several high impact incidents
of this kind have been reported in recent years, including the
attack on a power grid in Ukraine [1], the infamous Stuxnet
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malware that targeted nuclear centrifuges in Iran [2], and attacks
on a Saudi oil company [3]. In the past, ICSs ran on proprietary
hardware and software in physically secure locations, but more
recently they have adopted common information technology
(IT) stack and remote connectivity. This trend exposes ICSs
to cyber threats that leverage common technology stack attack
tools. At the same time, the ICS defender’s toolbox is limited
due to the need to support legacy protocols built without
modern security features, as well as the inadequate processing
capabilities of the endpoints. This problem can be addressed
by utilizing traditional IT network-based intrusion detection
systems (IDS) to identify malicious activity, which does not
rely on endpoint computational resources. However, the very
low number of known attacks on ICSs renders this approach
ineffective. Alternatively, model-based methods have been
proposed to detect anomalous behavior of the monitored
ICS [4]–[7]. Unfortunately, creating an accurate model of
complex physical processes is a very challenging task. It
requires an in depth understanding of the system and its
implementation, and is time consuming and difficult to scale.
Thus, recent studies have utilized machine learning to model
the system. Some of them used supervised learning [8], [9] and
achieved high precision results, however the supervised learning
approach is limited to the modeled attacks only. To overcome
this obstacle, a number of other studies used unsupervised deep
neural networks (DNNs) for detecting anomalies and attacks
in ICS data [10]–[12]. Kravchik and Shabtai [13] suggested
using unsupervised neural networks based on 1D CNNs and
demonstrated the detection of 31 out of 36 cyber attacks in
the popular SWaT dataset [14], improving upon previously
published results. This paper extends the research performed
in [13] and is aimed at answering the following questions that
were not addressed in that study.
• Can the generality and effectiveness of a 1D CNN
be validated using additional datasets, preferably from
different types of system?
• Are there alternative lightweight neural network architec-
tures that can be used in the method proposed in [13]?
• Can the detection of an anomaly be interpreted in such
a way that it provides actionable insights to the system
operator, namely how to pinpoint the attacked sensors or
actuators?
• Will detection in the frequency domain provide any
benefits compared to detection in the time domain?
• How robust are the proposed neural networks architectures
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2to adversarial machine learning attacks?
The contributions of this paper are as follows.
• An effective and generic method for detecting anomalies
and cyber attacks in ICS data using 1D CNNs and
undercomplete autoencoders (UAEs). The method was
validated on three public datasets and achieved better
performance than previously published research in this
area.
• A method for robust feature selection based on the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
• A method for attack detection explanation - attack
localization using neural network-based models.
• The efficient application of the above mentioned detection
method to the frequency domain which provides high
detection scores and guidelines for when to use it.
• A demonstration of the adversarial robustness of the
proposed method under a powerful white-box attacker
threat model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present the necessary background on ICSs, the considered
threat model, relevant neural network architectures, time-
frequency transformation, and adversarial machine learning. In
Section III, we survey related work, focusing on physical sys-
tem state-based detection research. Section IV, introduces the
datasets we used for validation. We describe our methodology
in Section V. The experiments and their results are described
in Section VI, and finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Industrial Control Systems
A typical ICS combines network-connected computers
with physical processes, which are both controlled by these
computers and provide the computers with feedback. The key
components of an ICS include sensors and actuators that are
connected to a local computing element, commonly called a
programmable logic controller (PLC) or a remote terminal unit
(RTU).
Sensors and actuators are usually connected to the PLC
with a direct cable connection, and commands are sent to the
PLC via a local networking protocol, such as CAN, Profibus,
DNP3, IEC 61850, IEC 62351, Modbus, or S7. PLCs of the
remote nodes are connected to the central control unit via
protocols, such as TCP, over a wireless, cellular, or wired
network. The connection is made with the help of a data
acquisition system (DAS) that bridges the local and remote
networking protocols. The central control node contains a
master terminal unit (MTU) that applies the control logic to
the RTUs and provides management capabilities to a human
machine interface (HMI) computer. A historian server that
collects and stores data from the RTUs is another important
ICS component. An additional common element of ICSs is an
engineering workstation running SCADA software that provides
a means to both monitor the PLCs and to change their internal
logic.
Recently, many SCADA and PLC components started
supporting the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP), which allows
the integration of industrial control applications with a standard
network stack. Using SCADA and PLC components supporting
such modern protocols enables system simplification, allowing
the removal of dedicated MTU and DAS components.
B. Attacks on ICSs and Threat Model
The central role of ICSs in critical infrastructure, medical
devices, transport, and other areas of society makes them an
attractive target for attacks. Motives for such attacks are diverse
and include criminals seeking control of an important asset
or blackmailing a victim, industrial espionage and sabotage,
political reconnaissance, cyber war, and privacy evasion.
An ICS can be attacked using several attack vectors including
software, hardware, communication protocols, the physical
environment, and human elements.
For example, an adversary can attack:
1) The HMI machine, by exploiting software vulnerabilities
in its OS and application stack, presenting a fake view of
the process and causing the operator to issue erroneous
commands [15],
2) The SCADA and/or engineering workstation machine,
by exploiting software vulnerabilities and obtaining full
control of the ICS, as it happened in Ukraine [1],
3) The communication network in the control segment, in
the remote segment, or between them, by performing
eavesdropping, or replay or false packet injection attacks,
4) The PLC, by exploiting software vulnerabilities or trust
between the PLC and SCADA; this will allow the attacker
to change the PLC logic influencing the controlled
process and cause damage, as in the Stuxnet case,
Fig. 1. A schematic of ICS architecture and possible attack locations on an
ICS system.
35) The sensors, by leveraging physical effects interfering
with the measurement or replacing the sensor with a
malicious one as shown in [16], or,
6) The actuators, by altering the signal sent by the actuators
to the controlled process, as described in [17].
The attack can also combine a number of vectors, for
example issuing malicious commands to the actuator and
replaying a valid system state to the SCADA, as done by
the Stuxnet malware. Figure 1 illustrates most common attack
locations.
Our threat model considers a powerful adversary that is able
to influence the physical state of the protected ICS. Regardless
of the attack vector, the most common ultimate goal of the
attacker is a physical-level process change. Hence, in this
research, we don’t assume any specific attack vector, and apply
a physics-based attack detection approach. The main idea of
this approach is that the behavior of the protected system
complies with immutable laws of physics and therefore can be
modeled. Monitoring the physical system state and its deviation
from the model facilitates the detection of anomalous behavior,
including the deviations caused by spoofed sensor readings
and injected control commands. For example, opening a valve
should result in an increase in the water level. If the level does
not increase or the speed of the increase is higher than usual,
the sensor reading could have been falsified, or the sensor
might be faulty.
Despite the fact that our anomaly detection domain is
purely physical, we argue that our method goes beyond
simple anomaly detection. As we show, it can detect sophis-
ticated multi-point cyber attacks that combine data tampering,
malicious commands and replay attacks. These attacks are
targeted, evasive, and performed by means of the cyber domain.
Therefore, we choose to classify the method as cyber attack
detection. Adding the cyber context to our detection domain,
e.g., by combining network and sensory data, is a promising
direction for future research. As the network data was not
available in most of the public datasets, we made the decision
to focus on physical-only detection in this research.
C. Convolutional Neural Networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are feedforward neural
networks popular in image processing domain. In the basic
neural network model, the layers are fully connected, which
means that a unit (a neuron) is connected to all of the units in
the subsequent layer. This requires the neuron to hold a very
large number of weights on these connections. This structure
does not scale well, and such a large number of parameters
(weights) will usually lead to overfitting. In addition, fully
connected networks ignore the input topology: input variables
can be presented in any order, and the outcome will be the same.
However, many kinds of data, including images, have a distinct
structure, and nearby pixels are highly correlated. CNNs address
these deficiencies by applying convolutions (filters) to small
regions of the input instead of performing matrix multiplication
on all of the input at once. The filter uses the same weights
for all of the locations and thus can detect features regardless
of their position in the image. A convolutional layer consists
Fig. 2. Denoising Autoencoder.
of several feature maps each detecting a different input feature.
1D CNNs can successfully be used for time series processing,
because time series have distinct 1D (time) locality that can
be extracted by convolutions [18].
D. Autoencoders
An autoencoder (AE) is a neural network trained to reproduce
its input [19], thereby learning useful properties of the data.
This is achieved by applying constraints on the network
which prevent copying the input to the output and cause the
network to learn the compact representation of the data. Due
to this ability, autoencoders are widely used for dimensionality
reduction and feature learning [19]. Autoencoders have two
major components: an encoder that transforms the input into
some internal representation, and a decoder that reconstructs the
input from this representation. The simplest kind of autoencoder
is an undercomplete autoencoder (UAE), which passes the data
through a bottleneck of a hidden layer with smaller dimensions
than the input and output. This bottleneck forces the network
to learn a subspace which captures principal features of the
data. Another way of forcing an autoencoder to learn important
input structural features is letting it reconstruct the original
input from the input after it has been corrupted by noise. A
common way to corrupt the input is to add some Gaussian
noise to it. Autoencoders that utilize this technique are called
denoising autoencoders (DAEs) (see Figure 2).
Variational autoencoders (VAE) [20] have become very
popular in the unsupervised learning of complex distributions
and in generating images of different kinds. While regular
autoencoders learn a compact representation of the input data,
there is no constraint on this compact representation. For
example, given an autoencoder network trained with many
images of dogs, we still don’t know how to build an internal
representation that could generate a dog when passed to
the decoder part of the network. VAE solves this problem
by applying constraints on the distribution of the compact
representation (called a latent variable or code). To impose this
constraint, the loss function is a sum of the data reconstruction
error (generalization error) and a deviation of the latent variable
distribution from some chosen prior distribution, typically a
unit Gaussian distribution. Once the network is trained, it is
possible to generate new images of dogs by drawing samples
from the unit Gaussian distribution and passing them to the
decoder. A VAE has three parts: an encoder, decoder, and prior
distribution (as illustrated in Figure 3). The encoder creates a
distribution of the latent variables for the given input, and the
4Fig. 3. Variational Autoencoder.
decoder returns a distribution of inputs corresponding to the
given latent variables. The network is trained to maximize the
likelihood of the data given the codes it assigns to it, while
maintaining the codes’ distribution close to the chosen prior
one.
E. Time - Frequency Domain Transformation
Raw data measured by ICS sensors produces a time series.
While in most ICS anomaly and attack detection research
this data is processed directly, it is very common in signal
processing to analyze data in the frequency domain. Fourier
transform (1) allows us to build a signal’s frequency domain
representation:
fˆ(k) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x)e−2piixkdx, (1)
where f is some function depending on time x, fˆ is its Fourier
transform, and k is the frequency. When dealing with periodic
data samples, rather than a continuous function, the discrete
Fourier transform is used:
Fk =
N−1∑
n=0
fne
−2piink/N , (2)
where fn denotes the n-th sample of f . Fourier transform
of a time series provides its spectrum over the entire period
of time measured. In order to detect changes in the signal
spectrum over time, the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) is
used. STFT applies the Fourier transform to short overlapping
segments of the time series.
Frequency domain analysis provides several advantages. First,
it provides a more compact and concise representation of most
of the dominant signal components. Second, it allows for the
detection of attacks involving changing the frequency of regular
operation modes, e.g., quickly starting and stopping the engine.
Lastly, according to the uncertainty principle [21], functions
localized in the time domain (e.g., a short spike) are spread
across many frequencies, and functions that are concentrated
in the frequency domain are spread across the time domain.
This means that slow attacks that usually evade time domain
detection methods will stand out in frequency analysis, but
short attacks will be difficult to detect using it.
F. Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Models
In this section, we provide a brief overview of adversarial
attacks. A more complete review of related work in the context
of this research is presented in Section III. Adversarial data
is specially crafted input samples that cause the algorithm to
produce incorrect results at test time. The field of adversarial
learning in DNNs has gained a lot of interest since [22]
showed that neural network-based classifiers can be tricked
into mislabeling an image by changing a small number of
pixels in a way that is imperceptible to the human eye. Since
then, successful adversarial attacks on neural networks have
been demonstrated in malware detection, speech classification,
and other areas.
Adversarial machine learning attacks can be divided into
poisoning attacks performed at training time and evasion
attacks performed at test time. In order to model adversarial
attacks, we need to consider the attacker’s goals and knowledge.
According to [23], the goals are further subdivided into
the desired violation (integrity, availability, or privacy) and
specificity (targeting a set of inputs or all of them, as well
as producing specific output or just any incorrect output). In
the context of anomaly detection, the attacker’s goal might
be to cause the system to classify an anomaly as benign
(specific integrity attack) or to classify many benign samples
as anomalous to decrease the trust in the detection results
(indiscriminate availability attack).
Bigglio et al. [23] define the attacker’s knowledge in terms
of the training data D, the feature set X , the algorithm f
and its objective function L, the training hyperparameters,
and the detection parameters w learned. In the context of our
research, X is the set of sensors’ and actuators’ states used to
train the model, while f and L represent the selected neural
network architecture and its loss function. Thus, the attacker’s
knowledge is represented by the components (D,X , f, w). The
worst-case perfect knowledge white-box scenario happens when
all four components are known. Gray-box attacks occur if at
least one of the components is not known and cannot be
reproduced. For example, the attacker might know the feature
set and the neural network type, but the network parameters
and weights are not known. In such cases, the attacker tries to
create a surrogate model using training data sets relevant to the
problem and transfers the attack created on the surrogate model
onto the real one. Black-box attacks are characterized by the
lack of specific knowledge about any of the four components.
The attacker, however, knows that some model is used for the
task at hand and can make educated guesses about the kind of
features it uses to solve it.
III. RELATED WORK
The area of anomaly and intrusion detection in ICSs has
been widely studied. Extensive surveys [24]–[26] and surveys
of surveys [27] are devoted to the classification of research
in this field. In our review of related work, we focus on ICS
anomalies and cyber attack detection using the physical state
of the system as measured by the sensors. As noted in [17], the
first step in physics-based detection is system state prediction.
By observing the deviation between the predicted and reported
system state, a decision is made on whether an attack or
anomaly occurred and how to score it. Hence, one of the main
ways to classify the research is by the prediction method used.
Auto-regressive (AR) models are used to predict the system
state in [28] and [29]. While popular in time series analysis,
these models have limitations in multivariate systems, when
5the state of one observed variable is correlated with another. In
our research, we use DNNs that don’t have these limitations.
Another popular way of modeling the system is rooted in
the control theory and uses the subsystem model identification
based on equation (3) which describes a linear dynamical
system:
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + k
yk = Cxk +Duk + ek,
(3)
where xk is the system state at time k, uk denotes the controller
commands to actuators, yk are the sensor measurements, k
is perturbation noise, ek is sensor noise, and A,B,C,D
are matrices modeling the dynamics of the system. This
approach has been used in previous studies, such as [30]–
[32]. The limitations of linear dynamical system modeling
include the requirement for controller command measurement,
a requirement which is not met in most datasets. In addition,
many attack scenarios involve altering PLC logic and do not
violate system dynamics. For those reasons, we chose to use
DNNs that are more flexible on both counts.
Specification-based system modeling can also be very
effective, as shown by [33] and [7]. In [33], the authors used
behavior rules to specify the safe system state for medical
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) and monitor deviation from
these rules. Distributed invariant-based mechanisms for smart
grids are presented in [34] and [35]. In [35], detection is
based on observing the physical state of the shared system,
detecting the power conservation invariants’ violation and
identifying the rogue component by the invariants’ verification
in its topological neighborhood. While effective in rogue
CPS controller identification, the solution proposed in [35]
is very specific to smart grids, where the physical invariants
are well-known and simple. Rahman et al. [34] used multiple
computationally powerful agents that communicated with each
other. One of the main drawbacks of these approaches is their
specificity - the solution should be tailored to the system and
its operating conditions; in contrast, our approach is generic
and requires no manual configuration.
PASAD is a novel approach to the problem presented in
[36]. PASAD is based on ideas from singular spectrum analysis
and detects attacks in the signal subspace representing the
deterministic part of the time series. The main idea of PASAD
is to break the signal into subseries and find their noise-reduced
representation by singular value decomposition. The principle
difference between our detection approach and PASAD is the
ability of our approach to detect anomalies in correlation among
input features, while PASAD is limited to a single time series.
In a recent competition on water distribution system cyber
attack detection (the BATADAL - BATtle of the Attack
Detection Algorithms [37]), seven teams demonstrated their
solutions on a simulated dataset. The best results were shown
by the authors of [38], who were able to model the system
precisely using MATLAB. The main limitation of this solution
is its reliance on the need and ability to create a precise
system model, both a non-generic and difficult task. Another
work that achieved a high score in the competition is [39] in
which the authors proposed a three-layer method, where the
first layer detects statistical anomalies, the second layer is a
neural network aimed at finding contextual inconsistencies with
normal operation, and the third layer uses principal component
analysis (PCA) on all sensor data to classify the samples
as normal or abnormal. Our work differs from [39] in the
following ways. First, we study the efficiency of a single
generic mechanism, as opposed to the multilevel system used
by [39]. Second, our solution evaluates types of neural networks
not covered by [39]. In addition, we study frequency domain
anomaly detection and adversarial robustness.
Another relevant study from the BATADAL competition
is [40]. In addition to other detection mechanisms, the authors
of [40] used VAEs to calculate the reconstruction probability
of the data. In our research, we found that VAEs are not
very accurate in reconstructing time series data. Therefore, we
suggest using simpler autoencoder models and demonstrate
their effectiveness at this task.
Neural networks have been used in additional physics-based
cyber attack detection research ( [10]–[12]). Unlike our work,
these studies use more complex recurrent and graphical models
and do not study the frequency domain.
Autoencoders have been used for anomaly and intrusion
detection before [41], [42]. The differences between this work
and [41] are that in our research (1) AEs are applied to raw
physical signals without statistical feature extraction, and (2)
AEs are applied to the frequency domain. We extend the
research in [42] by applying AEs to cyber attack detection in
time series, combining control, status and raw physical data,
as well as applying AEs to the frequency domain. We also
enhance the architecture of the network and present a feature
selection method which improves network performance.
After our research was complete we discovered a recent
publication by Taormina et al. that applied autoencoders to
the BATADAL dataset [43]. The authors demonstrated the
effectiveness of AEs and were able to achieve an F1 score
of 0.886. Also, the authors showed how to obtain insight on
the attack location from the model’s predictions. Our research
was performed in parallel to [43], was not influenced by its
findings, and differs from it in the following ways:
• we study both 1D CNNs and AEs on three different
datasets, two of which come from real-world testbeds,
• our AE architecture is different because it has been
adopted to multivariate time series prediction, uses noise
and an inflation layer; it also achieves a higher F1 score,
• we study frequency domain detection, and
• we present adversarial attacks on the proposed network
and its robustness.
Little attention has been given to adversarial attacks in the
ICS context, and there are a number of differences between
our study and the work in the area where most of adversarial
research has been done (image and sound processing):
• most of the existing work is focused on supervised learning
problems, while our research deals with a semi-supervised
learning,
• most of the existing work is focused on classification tasks,
while in our research we deal with prediction (regression),
• while in tasks such as image classification the output
variable (picture class) is not part of the input, in our task
the input and output features are same, and
6• in our case, there are multiple constraints on the internal
structure of the data, due to the laws of physics and PLC
logic, that are not present in images.
A successful evasion attack framework on machine learning
anomaly detection was demonstrated in [44]. The authors were
able to bring a monitored reactor to a dangerous pressure
level by manipulating sensor measurements in a way that was
classified by both a linear regression and a feed-forward neural
network as normal. In [45], the authors used a GAN (generative
adversarial network) in order to create stealthy attacks on an
ICS, evading a baseline anomaly detector. Most recently, Erba
et al. [46] showed how to create successful evasion attacks
against an autoencoders-based detection mechanism. The main
difference of [46] and our approach is the threat model chosen.
The authors of [46] consider a very powerful attacker that can
both generate arbitrary malicious inputs to the PLC and create
fake traffic that is fed to the detector. We consider a more
constrained attacker that can only control the sensory data that
is both seen by the PLC and the detector. We argue that our
threat model represents a more realistic scenario.
IV. DATASETS
A. SWaT
The Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed was built at
the Singapore University of Technology and Design. Although
a detailed description of the testbed and dataset can be found
in [14], we provide a brief description below. The testbed is a
Fig. 4. SWaT testbed process overview [14].
scaled-down fully operational water treatment plant. As shown
in Figure 4, the water goes through a six-stage process. Each
stage is equipped with a number of sensors and actuators.
The sensors include flow meters, water level meters, and
conductivity and acidity analyzers. Water pumps, chemical
dosing pumps, and valves that control inflow are the actuators.
The sensors and actuators of each stage are connected to the
corresponding PLC, and the PLCs are connected to the SCADA
system.
The dataset contains seven days of recording under normal
conditions and four days during which 36 attacks were
conducted. The entire dataset contains 946,722 records, labeled
as either attack or normal, with 51 attributes corresponding
to the sensor and actuator data. The threat model used in
Fig. 5. Attack 30 on the LIT101 sensor. LIT101 measures the water level
in the first tank. P101 pumps the water out of the tank to the second stage
processing. Note that after the attack is over, it takes a long time until the
system returns to its normal production cycle.
the experiment is a system that has already been infected by
attackers who spoof the system state to the PLCs causing
erroneous commands to be issued to the actuators, or override
the PLC commands with malicious ones. A table containing a
description and the timing of the attacks is provided in [14].
Each attack aims to achieve some physical effect on the system.
For example, attack 30 aims to cause underflow in the tank of
the first stage. For that purpose, the value of the water level
sensor LIT101 is fixed at 700mm, while pump P101, which
controls water outflow is kept open for 20 minutes. Figure 5
presents the attack, its effects, and the time it takes the system
to stabilize. The attacks were usually not stealthy, i.e., when a
command was issued to the actuator and the actuator changed
the system state, the change was not hidden by the attackers.
B. BATADAL
The BATADAL dataset represents a water distribution
network comprised of seven storage tanks with eleven pumps
and five valves, controlled by nine PLCs (see Figure 6). The
network was generated with epanetCPA [47], a MATLAB
toolbox that allows for the injection of cyber attacks and
simulates the response of the network to these attacks.
There are 43 variables representing the water tank levels,
the flow and status of all of the pumps, as well as the inlet and
Fig. 6. Hierarchy of the water distribution system used in the BATADAL
dataset [48].
7Fig. 7. Attack 12 on the L T2 sensor.
pressure for the pumping stations and valves. The training data
simulates hourly measurements collected for 365 days, resulting
in 8,761 records. The test dataset contains 2,089 records (from
87 days of recording). There are seven attacks present in the test
data. The attacks involved malicious actuator activation, PLC
set point changes, and sensor measurement manipulation. In
addition, the attacks were concealed from the SCADA system
by replacing the PLC-to-SCADA communication data with
the data recorded at the same hour during normal operation.
Figure 7 illustrates attack 12. The goal of this attack is to cause
tank T2 to overflow. The L T2 sensor’s readings are altered
to report lower levels and cause PLC3 to keep the valve V2
open. At the same time, the traffic from PLC3 to SCADA is
modified to replay previously recorded values of L T2, as well
as V2 flow and pressures. Figure 7 shows that the status of the
valve was not replayed, although the authors of [37] reported
that it was. Also, one can see that immediately after the attack
the system returns to its regular cycle. This looks unrealistic,
as the tank must be in an overflow state and it should take
time to process the excess water it contains. We estimate that
these represent limitations of the simulation.
C. WADI
Finding another high-quality real-world cyber physical
dataset containing attacks is not an easy task. The best candidate
we could find is WADI [49], collected from a scaled-down
water distribution testbed and built by the authors of SWaT.
The testbed consists of a number of large water tanks that
supply water to consumer tanks. The dataset contains 16 attacks
whose goal is to stop the water supply to the consumer tanks.
The attacks were conducted by opening valves and spoofing
sensor readings, and were partially concealed. The dataset is
significantly larger than the SWaT and BATADAL datasets,
and contains 1,209,610 data points in the training set and 126
features. The WADI dataset was made public recently, and
very few attack detection results utilizing this dataset have
been published. In [7], the authors proposed an agent-based
framework for CPS modeling and used it to detect attacks
on the WADI dataset. Unfortunately, the authors of [7] did
not publish the quantitative metrics of the detection results,
only reporting that 12 of 16 attacks were detected. In [50],
the authors use LSTM-based generative adversarial networks
(referred to as MAD-GANs in the paper) and show that they
outperform other methods, such as PCA, K-nearest neighbors
(KNN), and feature bagging (FB) on the SWaT and WADI
datasets.
V. METHODOLOGY
A. Data Analysis and Preprocessing
Our detection mechanism is based upon the ability to model
and predict the system’s behavior. To fulfill this requirement,
the following assumptions must hold: the training data must be
representative of the test data. More specifically, the training
data should contain all of the (latent) states, and the transitions
between them that appear in the test data. In other time-series
forecasting techniques, e.g., AR models and recurrent neural
networks, there is a stronger requirement that the data needs
to be stationary (i.e., maintains its probability distribution over
time) or can be transformed into stationary [19] form. We
found that a number of SWaT features do not have the same
distribution in the training and test data (see Figure 8). In order
to obtain a quantitative measure of the similarity between the
probability distributions of the training and test data, we used
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) [51]. We chose the
K-S test, because it is non-parametric and isn’t based on any
assumptions on the probability distributions tested. It also is
more sensitive than comparing the mean and standard deviation
or the t-test, both of which do not work well with multimodal
and non-normal distributions.
The K-S test statistic for two distributions is the maximal
difference between their empirical cumulative distribution
functions (ECDF):
K-S = sup
x
|F1(x)− F2(x)| , (4)
where F1 and F2 are ECDFs of the compared distributions.
They can be found as:
Fx =
1
n
n∑
i=1
I[−∞,x](Xi), (5)
where
I[−∞,x] =
{
1, if Xi < x
0, otherwise.
The original K-S test is limited to fully specified distributions
[52], however we found the slight modification described below
useful as a concise metrics for filtering out features unsuitable
for modeling. Using the maximum as a statistic makes the
K-S test extremely sensitive to small CDF differences when
the distribution’s mean is slightly offset on the x axis. To
increase the test’s robustness, we used the area between the
CDFs instead, which is calculated as:
K-S∗ =
∫
x
|F1(x)− F2(x)| dx. (6)
Figure 8 illustrates three SWaT features, their values over time,
histograms, and K-S and K-S* statistics.
8We calculated the K-S∗ statistic for all SWaT and
BATADAL features. The features were normalized to (0,1)
scale. As Figure 9 shows, many of the SWaT features differ
greatly between the training and test sets. Such features would
create a lot of false positive alarms and must be excluded from
the modeling. In addition to data normalization and feature
statistic profiling, we subsampled the SWaT data at a five
second rate. Subsampling provides a regularization mechanism
which prevents overfitting and allows us to operate with a
smaller amount of data.
As for the BATADAL dataset, all but one (P J280) of its
features have very low K-S* metrics (10 or less). This striking
difference between the real-world and simulated data stresses
the need to validate any findings in realistic setups.
For the WADI dataset, subsampling at a ten second rate was
applied, and twelve unstable features were removed.
The feature selection step should be done prior to model
training, hence requiring different treatment for different data
Fig. 8. Feature statistic comparison. LIT101 has a very similar distribution
in both the training and test data. AIT401 has a similar but slightly offset
distribution. K-S has a high value, but K-S* correctly classifies the distributions
as close. AIT201 has very different distributions.
Fig. 9. K-S∗ statistic for the SWAT dataset. A number of features differ
significantly between the training and test sets.
availability scenarios:
• if both training and test datasets are provided, the selection
should be done based on both of them,
• if only the training dataset is available, the test can be
done on two parts of it, e.g., comparing the statistics of
the first half of the data to the second, and
• a periodic validation of the features’ consistency can be
performed during the test period, and the model should
be retrained if significant changes are detected.
B. Undercomplete Autoencoders Design
After experimenting with multiple AE architectures, includ-
ing LSTM-based AEs, variational AEs, and denoising AEs, we
discovered that the best detection performance is achieved with
the simplest undercomplete AEs. We describe the selected AE
architecture here, and a comparison of the results in provided
in Section VI-B.
The best results were achieved using the AE network variant
adapted for multivariate sequence reconstruction. The network
design is as follows:
• an optional corruption layer applying Gaussian noise to
the input sequence,
• a fully connected layer with an ReLU or tanh activation
function inflating the input; the purpose of this layer is
to enlarge the hypothesis space,
• an encoding layer that flattens the input and produces its
compact representation using a fraction of the input size;
in our experiments the best results were achieved using
the compact representation twice smaller than the input,
• a decoding layer reconstructing the original sequence from
its compact representation.
This architecture can deal with time sequences of arbitrary
length and is presented in Figure 10. We conducted a compari-
son between the detection performance of a loss function based
on the reconstruction error for the predicted data points only
versus the reconstruction error for the entire sequence. The
latter produced much better results as illustrated in Figure 11.
C. Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis (PCA) transforms a set of
variables to a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables,
orthogonal to each other. The new variables are linear com-
binations of the original ones. PCA is based on eigenvector
analysis and is often used for reducing the dimensions of the
data to a small number of principal components that represent
the data’s internal structure in the way best explaining the data
variance. We used PCA as a baseline algorithm to compare
the performance of the neural networks. The use of PCA for
anomaly detection in ICS is not new; it was suggested as one
of the detection layers in [39], and [42] used it for detecting
anomalies in a simulated Lorenz system and telemetry data.
In [39], detection was conducted in principal components
subspace. Anomalies found in this subspace do not have a
direct physical meaning in the original data feature space, and
are hard to interpret and explain.
In our research, we used the approach outlined in Algorithm
1. Our analysis restores the prediction to the original feature
9Fig. 10. Autoencoders architecture used in this research.
Fig. 11. Improvement of detection score when measuring loss for the entire
sequence in autoencoders.
space thus allowing for the natural application of the detection
and explanation method we use for neural networks, as
described below. To distinguish this detection method from
detection in the principal components’ subspace, we refer to
it as PCA-Reconstruction in Section VI. We implemented an
extension to the classic PCA analysis. PCA usually operates on
single time step vectors. This allows for the detection of context
inconsistencies between multiple features but is less powerful
Algorithm 1 Predict xtest given training data xtrain and using
PCA.
1: function PCAANALYSIS(xtrain, xtest, components)
2: pcaModel← PCA(components)
3: pcaModel.fit(xtrain)
4: xtestPCA← pcaModel.transform(xtest)
5: xˆtest ← pcaModel.inverse transform(xtestPCA))
6: return xˆtest
in the detection of time-related inconsistencies in a single
feature. To compensate for this deficiency, we implemented
a windowed-PCA algorithm, which breaks the data into time
windows of a given width, performs the analysis depicted in
Algorithm 1 on vectors containing multiple data points, and
then restores the window predictions into the original signal
shape. We later discovered that this idea was described in
[53], where it is called Dynamical PCA. Two variants of this
windowed-PCA algorithm were implemented: with overlapping
and non-overlapping windows. The standard PCA algorithm
implementation from the Python scikit-learn package with the
number of components equal to half of the modeled features
was used as a basis for our experiments.
D. Frequency Domain Transformation
In order to explore the usefulness of frequency domain attack
detection we first had to transform the signals from the time
domain to the frequency domain. The following method was
used to create signal representation in the frequency domain
(outlined in Algorithm 2 and illustrated in Figure 12).
1) Determine the dominant frequency of each signal (the
frequency with the most energy) using the discrete fast
Fourier transform (DFFT)(function frequencyAnalysis,
lines 1-12).
2) Determine the window for the short-time Fourier trans-
form (STFT) based on the dominant frequency period.
It was found that the optimal window is between one
and two periods of the dominant frequency (line 16).
3) Transform the signals into their frequency representation.
a) Split the entire signal into overlapping windows.
b) Perform STFT for each window (these two items
are presented by the call to spectrogram at line 17).
c) Binarize the entire spectrum of STFT into a number
of bins. Calculate the total energy of the signal in
each bin.
d) Pick a small number of bins with the most energy
(lines 18-22). The energy values will represent the
feature in the frequency domain for the correspond-
ing time window. We found that two or three bins
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were sufficient for representing the features. It is
also possible to calculate the number of bins based
on the ratio of the total energy they contain (e.g.,
at least 90%).
4) Apply the chosen neural network model (1D CNN or
AE) to the frequency domain representation. As each
feature is represented separately, the ability to locate the
attack is maintained.
E. Adversarial Threat Model and Robustness Analysis
As this research was the first study of the proposed detection
method’s robustness to adversarial attacks, we assumed the
worst-case scenario - a white-box attacker that knows every-
thing about the model used for the detection, including its
weights. We consider an attacker that is trying to perform
a specific integrity attack, namely to cause a physical level
change in the system’s behavior while staying undetected by
the monitoring anomaly detection system; the attacker can
influence the values of sensors sent to the PLC but does not
have complete control of the network, in either the remote or
the control segment. Such an attack scenario is very common,
especially in ICSs with sensors distributed over a large area and
that send their data to a PLC residing in a physically protected
and monitored center. In this setup, an adversary can replace
Algorithm 2 Transform signal s into frequency domain
representation
1: function FREQUENCYANALYSIS(s, sampling period) .
Find the dominant frequency of the signal and its period
2: N ← len(s)
3: freq ← DFFT (s) . The discrete FFT of the signal
4: magn← abs(freq)[: N//2] ∗ 1/N . The magnitudes
of the real part of the FFT
5: freq magn← listOf(freq,magn)
6: sorted freq ← decreasedOrderSort(freq magn)
7: if sorted freq[0][0] then . Ignore the constant
component if it has the most energy
8: fundamental freq ← sorted freq[0][0]
9: else
10: fundamental freq ← sorted freq[1][0]
11: period← (1.0/fundamental freq)/sampling period
12: return (fundamental freq, period)
13: function FREQUENCYTRANS-
FORM(s, rate, ratio, b num). Represent signal as energy
in the most dominant frequency bands.
14: all freq bins← 10
15: (f freq, period)← frequencyAnalysis(s, rate)
16: STFT window ← period ∗ ratio
17: freqs, Sx← spectrogram(s, rate, STFT window)
18: bands← linspace(0, len(freqs), all freq bins+1)
19: for i = 0 to all freq bins do
20: bands energyi ←
∑bandsi+1
i=bandsi
Sxi
21: dominant bands ←
decreasedOrderSort(bands energy)[: b num]
22: return dominant bands
Fig. 12. Frequency transformation of the L T1 feature. The first row depicts
the raw signal. The second row represents the STFT spectrogram on the left
and the power density distribution in the spectrum bands on the right. The
last two rows are the frequency domain features - the power density in the
first two bands.
the original sensor with a malicious one, reprogram the sensor,
change its calibration, influence the sensor externally, or just
send false data to the PLC over the cable/wireless connection.
We argue that this setup is much more practical than an attacker
controlling the internal network of the remote segment or even
the network of the control segment, the scenario studied in
[46]. In our threat model the attacker’s input is processed by
both the PLC and the detection system, hence the attacker’s
goal is to produce the input that will at the same time:
1) cause the intended physical impact on the system, and
2) be close enough to the prediction of the detector to stay
under the detection threshold.
Other characteristics of our threat model include:
• the attacker can change multiple sensors,
• the attacker can prepare the attacks offline; we argue
that if the system is characterized by periodic behavior,
the attacker can choose the moment of the attack and
precompute the system state in our perfect knowledge
threat model, and
• the values of the sensors after the attack should be within
or close to the valid range of the sensor values (e.g. an
on/off sensor can’t accept any other value).
As we did not possess access to the testbeds, we based our
study on adversarial manipulation of the SWaT dataset attacks.
While this method cannot replace testing with a real system,
it can provide an approximation of the ability to produce the
desired adversarial inputs. The two main limitations of such
data-only research are:
1) it is limited to the attacks already present in the data set;
even if none of them can’t be concealed by an adversarial
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input there may be other attacks that have this capability,
2) there is no way of testing the physical effect of an
adversarial sample found analytically on the real system.
The adversarial robustness study was conducted as follows.
First, eighteen attacks from the SWaT dataset caused by spoofed
sensors were selected. For each attack we performed gradient-
based search for the adversarial input as outlined in Algorithm 3.
This algorithm is adapted to a sequence prediction model that
processes the input using subsequences of length l, which we
assume is also known to the attacker.
Algorithm 3 Find xadv given a trained model M, test data
with attack xatt, sub-sequence length l, a detection threshold
τ , acceptable noise level , input constraints φ.
1: function FINDSUBSEQADVINPUT(M, xatt, l, τ , , φ)
2: M′ ←M+∇xJ(θ, x, y) . Add to the model graph
the cost function gradient calculation J given the model
parameters θ, input x and correct output y with respect to
the input x. ADV LR is the adversarial learning rate
3: xadv ← [] . Initialize as empty
4: for ss← nextSubSequence(xatt, l) do
5: noise← zeros like(ss)
6: advIt← 0
7: while advIt < MAX ADV ITERATIONS
do
8: noisy input← ss+ noise
9: noisy input ←
enforceConstraints(noisy input, φ)
10: model residue, grad← runModel(M′
11: if model residue < τ then break
12: step← ADV LR ∗max(abs(grad))
13: noise← noise− step ∗ grad . Update the
noise
14: noise← clip(noise, ) . Make sure the noise
does not pass the acceptable level
15: advIt← advIt+ 1
16: xadv.append(noisy input)
17: return xadv
However, Algorithm 3 finds adversarial variants for indi-
vidual subsequences, and does not consider the following
constraints of the way neural networks are used in our method:
• each data point is used in l subsequences, where l is the
subsequence length;
• as the previous data points are used to predict the next
one, perturbing a data point at time t will require changes
to earlier data points so that the prediction at time t will
be close enough to the desired value; these changes will
need to propagate back in time,
• if data gradients are used as enrichment features, as
described in [13], the adversarial gradient calculation
should consider these enrichment features as well, even
though they are not part of the trained system model.
In order to cope with these constraints, we needed to create
a wrapper model (WM) for the original model M. WM
represents the processing of all the input including enrichment
feature generation and subsequence generation as one graph,
Fig. 13. A wrapper model for adversarial learning. The underlying model
under attack uses sequences of three time points to predict the subsequent
time point.
allowing for full gradient propagation from the model’s
prediction to all of the original input, not just a specific
subsequence. Figure 13 illustrates a wrapper model for a case
when three time steps are used to predict a single subsequent
time step, without considering additional feature enrichment.
The final algorithm used for adversarial input generation follows
the logic of Algorithm 3, with the following modifications:
1) a wrapper model is created, instead of performing simple
addition of the gradient (line 2),
2) as the wrapper model optimizes all of the input, there is
no need in for the loop in line 4,
3) we added adaptive an learning rate update to accelerate
optimization.
F. Anomaly Detection and Scoring Method
The anomaly detection method used in this research is based
on the one we used in [13], however in the current study we
extend it in a number of ways which are elaborated upon below.
We trained a neural network until its training error reached the
desired value (usually less than 0.1). The network is used to
predict the future values of the data features based on previous
values. Thus, the model performs the function
(yˆh+n, yˆh+n+1, . . . , yˆh+n+m) = f(yn−1−l, . . . , yn−1) (7)
where yi is a feature vector at time i, yˆi is the estimation
of the feature vector, l and m represent the input and output
sequence length respectively, and h is the prediction horizon.
We generalized the method to allow the prediction of arbitrary
length sequences in the future with a specified horizon, e.g.,
predicting 256 time steps starting with the fifth time step from
the last input time. The residuals’ vectors are calculated as:
~rt =
∣∣∣~yt − ~ˆyt∣∣∣ . (8)
The residuals are used to trigger the anomaly alert in one of
two ways. In the first, the residuals are normalized by dividing
them by the maximal per feature residuals for the training data,
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and the maximum of the normalized residuals is compared to
a threshold τ :
~Rt =
~rt
max~r
. (9)
In order to prevent false alarms on short-term deviations,
we require that the residual exceed the threshold for at least a
specified duration of time window w. Thus, an anomaly alert
Ai at time i is determined by:
Ai =
i∏
t=i−w
max ~Rt > τ. (10)
The hyperparameters τ and w are determined by setting a
maximal accepted false alarm rate for the validation data and
finding the solution to:
(τ, w) = argmin
τ,w
ωτ · ωw{(τ, w) | |A(τ, w)| ≤ FPmax},
(11)
where ωτ and ωw are weights of the threshold and the window
correspondingly, A(τ, w) is the set of attack alerts detected
with the specific threshold and window values, and FPmax is
the maximal allowed number of false alarms in the validation
data. In other words, we are looking for the hyperparameter
values that don’t produce more than the permitted number of
false alerts, while minimizing the product of their weights.
The weight of a hyperparameter is proportional to its index
in the argument space. For example, if the possible window
value space is 5, 10, 15, 20, the corresponding weights will
be 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1. Using weights allows us to normalize
the contribution of both hyperparameters regardless of their
absolute values.
The second way to detect the attacks differs from the first
one by normalizing the residuals using their mean and standard
deviation (by feature) and is described in [13]. In this research,
we found that in the case of the SWaT dataset, using the
residuals’ mean and standard deviation based on the test data
produced better results than using the statistics based on the
training data. Updating threshold statistics with test data, a
common practice in online anomaly detection, compensates for
data drift. This finding hinted at the presence of data drift in
the SWaT dataset, and it was indeed detected and dealt with,
as we described in Section V-A.
In order to produce results comparable with previous
research, we used the same performance metrics as other
works using the corresponding dataset. For SWaT and WADI,
the metrics are precision, recall and F1 and they are calculated
based on log record labels contained in the dataset.
In the BATADAL competition, the score was calculated as
a weighted sum:
S = γ · STTD + (1− γ) · SCLF (12)
where STDD is the time-to-detection score, SCLF is the
classification score, and γ determines the relative importance of
the two scores and is set to 0.5. The details of the calculation of
both scores are based on the log record labels and are described
in [37]. To summarize, our extensions to the anomaly detection
method used in [13] are:
• generalization of the prediction, allowing arbitrary length
sequence prediction and arbitrary prediction horizon,
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF NEURAL NETWORKS ON THE BATADAL
DATASET1
Method Attacks Score STDD SCLF F1rec
Abokifa et al. [39] 7 0.949 0.958 0.940 0.88
Chandy et al. [40] 7 0.802 0.835 0.768 0.538
1D CNN 7 (1 fp) 0.894 0.915 0.873 0.833
AE 7 0.926 0.925 0.927 0.919
VAE 7 (3 fp) 0.882 0.919 0.846 0.783
PCA-Reconstruction 7 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.875
AE Frequency 7 0.969 0.980 0.959 0.937
1 We omitted the results of [38], who achieved the score of 0.97 and
F1 of 0.97, as their approach is based on reconstructing the simulation
parameters and is not applicable to real-world cases.
• addition of max-based method for threshold detection, and
• formalization of the hyperparameters criteria.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
A. Evaluating 1D CNN Performance with BATADAL Dataset
To answer our first research question, we validated the
effectiveness of 1D CNNs with the BATADAL dataset. We
modeled all features, except for P J280, due to its high K-
S* value. Multiple hyperparameter configurations were tested,
both using grid search and genetic algorithms [54]. The best
score presented in Table I was achieved with an eight-layer
1D CNN using a sequence length of 18 data points. From the
frequency domain analysis, which is described later, we learned
that the period of the dominant frequency for BATADAL is 24
hours (data points). Therefore, 18 points represent a trade-off
between capturing enough historical information and including
too much data which causes less precise predictions. Figure 14
illustrates the influence of hyper parameters on the detection
score.
Fig. 14. Influence of 1D CNN filters on detection score for BATADAL.
Results for 8 layers model.
As Table I shows, the 1D CNN detected all of the attacks
and achieved high scores, however it did not achieve the
performance of the best BATADAL competitors. Some of
the attacks were not detected due to the attack concealment
techniques used in BATADAL. Therefore, we conclude that
while 1D CNN networks are indeed effective in detecting cyber
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attacks in CPSs, there is room for improvement in terms of
precision, recall, and timeliness of detection.
B. Undercomplete Autoencoders
As VAEs were used in a related work ( [40]), we explored
multiple VAE configurations, using both grid search and genetic
algorithms (the best configuration results are presented in
Table II), and discovered that the generative nature of VAEs
causes less precise predictions and lower recall.
TABLE II
VAE AND AE AVERAGE F1 COMPARISON FOR
BATADAL.1
Length 1 3 5 7
VAE 0.745 0.690 0.719 0.773
AE 0.879 0.864 0.889 0.869
1 Tests performed with the code size ratio
of 0.5 and a single layer.
This VAE behavior is consistent with the results obtained in
image generation, as reported in [19]. As Table I shows, VAEs
obtained a lower score than simple non-generative AEs.
As shown in Table I, our simple AE network produced
better detection scores than the 1D CNN and approached the
best results of the competition winners; its attack location
capabilities were also better than these of the 1D CNN. As
a point of comparison, we also used PCA with the same
number of components used with the AEs. As expected,
the AEs performed better than PCA, as they are able to
capture non-linear dependencies between features [19]. We
were surprised to discover that our method of PCA-based
anomaly detection showed excellent results, falling not far
behind the AEs. The result presented in Table I is for the
PCA-Reconstruction algorithm; in contrast, windowed-PCA
didn’t show any improvement for BATADAL (unlike for SWaT
and WADI) as shown in Table III.
To verify the effectiveness of our AE- and PCA-based
detection in a more realistic setup, we applied both to the
SWaT dataset. As shown in Table IV, the AEs obtained a high
F1 score, comparable to the best results achieved using a 1D
CNN in [13]. In addition, AE-based networks are smaller (for
short sequences) and faster to train, as shown in Table V.
Again, we were very surprised by the excellent performance
of both simple and windowed-PCA. The most likely reason for
this success is that in the SWaT dataset, many relations between
TABLE III
PCA DETECTION F1 SCORES FOR DIFFERENT SEQUENCE LENGTHS.
Length SWaT BATADAL WADI
1 0.8172 0.8747 0.54
2 0.8312 0.8255 0.552
3 0.84 0.703 0.562
4 0.8505 0.6948 0.550
5 0.8648 0.6279 0.653
6 0.8652 0.6855 0.669
7 0.8788 0.6003 0.67
8 0.8552 0.5663 0.683
9 0.854 0.5962 0.656
10 0.8762 0.4791 0.664
TABLE IV
SWAT ATTACK DETECTION PERFORMANCE COMPARISON.
Method Precision Recall F1
DNN [11] 0.983 0.678 0.803
SVM [11] 0.925 0.699 0.796
TABOR [12] 0.862 0.788 0.823
1D CNN [13] 0.968 0.791 0.871
PCA-Reconstruction 0.885 0.759 0.817
Windowed-PCA (window=7) 0.92 0.841 0.879
AE 0.890 0.803 0.844
AE Frequency 0.924 0.827 0.873
features are linear, and PCA can capture them. As PCA has an
analytic solution that does not require iterative optimization, its
training is much faster then the discussed neural networks (see
Table V). This answers our second research question - AEs are a
lightweight and effective alternative neural network architecture
that can be used for anomaly and cyber attack detection in
CPSs. In addition, PCA provides a simple alternative that can
be sufficient in many real-world setups.
C. Attack Detection Explainability
Once an attack has been detected, the ability to localize
the attack is very important. Using a neural network to model
each feature in the monitored system allows us to assess which
sensors and actuators were involved in the attack. The attack
indicator for a feature i at a time t is the corresponding residual
rit bypassing the threshold τ . Analyzing the 1D CNN attack’s
location detection we observed the advantages of the combined
feature modeling over modeling the features separately. When
each feature is modeled separately, the model often makes a
prediction based on the recent past and thus is mainly useful
for detecting abrupt non-characteristic changes of the feature.
To counter this effect, we increased the prediction horizon, so
that recent past values become less useful. This resulted in the
discovery of more attacks as well as in more false positives.
On the other hand, when we modeled a number of features
related to a single PLC or a number of related PLCs together,
1D CNN models capture dependencies between them. This
results is more complete and accurate attack detection, both
in terms of time and location. We also observed that spoofing
a single feature might trigger behavior changes of multiple
features, resulting in all of them being considered anomalous,
as shown in Figure 15.
Table VI summarizes attack location detection for the attacks
on the first stage of the SWaT testbed.
As Table VI shows, the 1D CNN can almost always identify
the feature that was attacked directly, and can also locate the
related features influenced by the attack. The attack location
detection in the BATADAL dataset is summarized in Table
VII. In the BATADAL dataset, the attacks were concealed by
replaying previously recorded valid data, but the network was
able to detect them by detecting anomalies in the dependent
features that were not replayed. Regarding the AEs, as Table VII
shows, in most of the cases, AEs were able to pinpoint the
attacked features despite the concealment of the attack.
To answer our third research question, our modeling method
locates the attacked features, provided they are not replayed.
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TABLE V
TRAINING TIME AND MODEL SIZE COMPARISON FOR BATADAL.1
AE 1D CNN PCA
Seq. length 1 3 5 18 18 18 18 1 3 5 18
Layers 1 1 1 1 4 8 12 1 3 5 18
1 training epoch time, s 0.268 0.288 0.306 0.459 0.641 0.878 1.761 0.061 0.100 0.207 0.439
Model Size, Kb 67 587 1624 20957 697 3689 50417 6 15 24 81
1 Both AEs and 1D CNN used a three-fold inflation layer. AEs did not use inflation in decoding. CNNs used 32 filters.
Fig. 15. SWaT attack 1 location interpretation. The areas highlighted in
red indicate the detected abnormal feature behavior. The attack opened the
MV101 valve, letting more water into an already full tank. The model detects
other related features as being abnormal too, e.g., water flow into a full tank
(indicated by FIT101) and abnormally high water level (indicated by LIT101).
Attacks 2 and 3, which were carried out soon after the first attack can be seen
as well. Y-axes on all graphs represent normalized sensor values.
However, we found that the attack may trigger a reaction
in many features. In that case our method will report all
features influenced by the attack, without distinguishing the
original cause from its consequences. By comparing the list
of features reported to be attacked (Table VII) to the system
TABLE VI
ATTACK LOCATION DETECTION FOR THE ATTACKS IN THE FIRST
STAGE OF THE SWAT TESTBED1
Attack Attack Description Attacked FeaturesDetected
1 Open MV101 to causeoverflow
FIT101, LIT101, MV101,
P101
2 Turn on P102 to cause aburst pipe FIT101, LIT101, P102
3 Increase LIT101 to causeunderflow LIT101
21 Keep MV101 on; set valueof LIT101 at 700 mm LIT101, MV101, P101
26 Turn P101 on continuouslyto cause underflow
FIT101, LIT101, MV101,
P102
28 Close P302, causing theoutflow to stop LIT101, P101
30
Turn P101 and MV101 on;
set value of LIT-101 at 700
mm
LIT101, P102
33 Set LIT101 to a high valueto cause underflow FIT101,LIT101, MV101
34 Turn P101 off P101, P102
36 Set LIT101 to a low valueto cause overflow LIT101, P101
1 The features directly attacked appear in bold font.
architecture (Figure 6) it is easy to see that the detected features
are related to the attack area. The same observation is true
for SWaT. So our method, while not being able to point out
the attack point precisely in a general case, is able to locate the
attack area, which provides significant value to the operator.
Moreover, we argue that given only historian-based data, it is
unfeasible in a general case to determine the root cause
of the attack. Our claim is due to the fact that PLCs are
hard real-time computers that should complete their scan cycle
(reading the inputs, running the logic, and updating the outputs)
in milliseconds. Due to a much larger time granularity of the
historian records (one second for SWaT and WADI, one hour
for BATADAL), our detection algorithm sees both the attack
and its consequences in the same data point, and the causality
is lost. In order to be able to pinpoint the original attack point,
we need to augment our dataset, possibly with the network
data, and this item will be a topic of future research.
D. Frequency Domain Detection
Our fourth research question seeks to explore the usefulness
of frequency domain attack detection. Although the time
and frequency domain represent the same information, the
compactness of periodic signal representation in the frequency
domain could help in detecting anomalies. We used an AE
network for both SWaT and BATADAL frequency domain
detection. The network consisted of one to three fully connected
TABLE VII
ATTACK LOCATION DETECTION FOR BATADAL1 2
Attack Attack Description
Attacked Features
Detected by 1D
CNN
Attacked Features
Detected by AE
8
Change the L T3
thresholds to cause
underflow
P J300, P J256 L T3, L T7,...
9
Fake L T2 read-
ings to cause over-
flow
P J300, P J289
P J422
L T2, P J300,
P J422
10 Turn the pumpPU3 on F PU1, P J269
L T1, F PU2,
P J269 ...
11 Turn the pumpPU3 on
L T1, F PU1,
P J269, ...
L T1, F PU2,
P J269, ...
12
Fake L T2 read-
ings to cause over-
flow
P J300, P J289 P J300, P J289,P J422
13 Change the L T7thresholds P J302, P J307
L T7, P J302,
P J307
14
Alter the T4 signal
to cause overflow
in T6
P J300, P J289,
P J422 L T4, P J300
1 The features directly attacked appear in bold font.
2 More features were detected as anomalies; only the most strongly
indicated ones are listed.
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TABLE VIII
AVERAGE F1 SCORES FOR BATADAL USING AES AND FREQUENCY
DOMAIN.
Window Step Frequency Bands Layers F1
24 2 3 1 0.882
36 2 3 1 0.887
36 2 3 2 0.897
64 2 3 3 0.765
128 8 3 2 0.631
layers followed by an encoder and decoder(see Table VIII for
selected results).
For BATADAL, we were able to match the score of the
best previously published result [38] (see Table I), however the
detector of [38] is built for the specific BATADAL configuration,
while our architecture is generic.
For SWaT, we first conducted a statistical analysis of the
frequency domain representation and removed those features
that differed significantly between the training and test data.
On the remaining data we were able to obtain an F1 score of
0.873, which is slightly better than the previously published
results. While these results are very encouraging and suggest
further study and validation, we discovered one limitation of
frequency domain detection. In order to be able to transform the
data into the frequency representation, we use windows of at
least one period of the dominant frequency. The consequence
of this is a lack in the ability to distinguish between short
attacks that quickly follow one another in the same window.
Although in reality this might be a mild concern, in the SWaT
dataset many short attacks occur in succession. Our method
usually detects them as one long attack, which reduces the
precision metrics. Thus, in general, the answer to our fourth
research question is positive: frequency domain analysis can
contribute to attack detection, but it has its limitations.
E. Additional Validation with the WADI Dataset
With the WADI dataset we were able to achieve substantially
better results than those reported in [50], as shown in Table X.
The unstable feature removal improved our ability to detect
attacks in general, as our PCA result is significantly higher
than the result reported in [50]. In this case, the windowed-
PCA algorithm was able to improve the results of the PCA-
Reconstruction. For the 1D CNN, we modeled each PLC
of WADI separately and then merged the detection. A 1D
CNN model with eight layers and sequences of 16 data points
successfully detected 14 attacks and outperformed both PCA
and MAD-GAN. We should stress that the 16 data points
belong to the data subsampled at a 1/10 rate and thus represent
160 original data points. However, the best results in our
TABLE IX
AVERAGE F1 DETECTION SCORES FOR
WADI.1
Length 1 3 5 7
AE 0.691 0.618 0.691 0.732
1 Tests performed with the code size ratio
of 0.5 and a single layer.
experiments were achieved by autoencoders, using the AE
model with sequences of length 7 (see Table IX for partial
results presentation and Table X for cross-algorithms best
results comparison).
Unfortunately, the WADI dataset did not appear to be suitable
for frequency domain analysis. Only 44 of 127 features had a
clear dominant frequency, and the frequency was very low (with
a period of 1440 minutes or 24 hours). Such very long periods
result in poor resolution in detecting short attacks (attacks in the
WADI dataset are about ten minutes long). Other features did
not have any clear periodicity. We consulted with the dataset
authors who indicated that the production cycle of WADI
is driven by consumer demand and these demands patterns
changed hourly. Thus WADI represents ICSs without a stable
production cycle and therefore frequency domain analysis is not
applicable to them. To summarize, we successfully validated
our detection methods on the WADI dataset. The absolute
performance results of attack detection for the WADI dataset
was lower than for SWaT and BATADAL. Our communication
with the WADI creators revealed that in addition to the irregular
consumer patterns, there were more issues preventing precise
detection, such as faulty sensors, sensors with high noise, and
more. Thus, WADI probably represents a more realistic case
of the real world anomaly detection systems need to cope with.
F. Adversarial Robustness of the Proposed Method
First, the ability to create adversarial examples on a model of
a single feature was tested. In order to consider the worst-case
scenario, no constraints were set on the allowed adversarial
noise. The experiments show that our wrapper model-based
method is indeed capable of creating adversarial examples
that cause the desired malicious physical effect and are not
detected by the 1D CNN model. Figure 16 illustrates attack 7
from the SWaT dataset. The measurement of the water level
sensor LIT301 is spoofed to be much higher, causing underflow.
When an 1D CNN model created for LIT301 was used to detect
anomalies in the relevant time period, it produced the prediction
shown in Figure 17.
After the adversarial optimization we were able to produce
input that retains the physical characteristics of the attack
(maintaining the spoofed high level for the attack period)
and was predicted by the model very closely, thus going
TABLE X
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF ATTACK DETECTION FOR THE
WADI DATASET
Method Precision Recall F1
PCA1 0.3953 0.0563 0.10
KNN1 0.0776 0.0775 0.08
FB1 0.086 0.086 0.09
EGAN1 0.1133 0.3784 0.17
MAD-GAN1 0.4144 0.3392 0.37
PCA-Reconstruction 0.763 0.571 0.653
Windowed-PCA (window=4) 0.807 0.593 0.683
1D CNN 0.697 0.731 0.714
AE 0.834 0.681 0.750
1 As reported in [50].
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Fig. 16. SWaT attack 7. LIT301 is spoofed to cause underflow.
Fig. 17. A 1D CNN model prediction for SWaT attack 7. During the attack
and its recovery, the prediction is very different from the observed value.
Fig. 18. A 1D CNN model prediction for SWaT attack 7 after adversarial
input optimization. The adversarial input is expected to cause underflow and
is undetected by the model .
undetected (see Figure 18. However, when we added a single
additional feature to the model, the adversarial optimization
undid the attacker’s desired physical effect - the adversarial
input conforms to the original model’s prediction and does not
cause underflow (see Figures 19 and 20). The same behavior
was observed with AE-based models. In addition, we observed
that using noise to corrupt the input, as described in Section
II-D increases the robustness of the model to the adversarial
evasion abilities even further, because the random noise applied
to the adversarial examples is different between the adversarial
training and testing time.
Generating adversarial inputs for other attacks demonstrated
the same or even more robust behavior: sometimes it was not
possible to create adversarial input that preserves the intended
physical effect for a one-feature model (illustrated in Figure 21).
Fig. 19. A 1D CNN model prediction for SWaT attack 7 with two fields. One
can also see artefacts of another attack happening before attack 7.
Fig. 20. A 1D CNN model prediction for SWaT attack 7 after adversarial input
optimization when using two fields. The adversarial input loses its desired
physical impact .
Fig. 21. A 1D CNN model prediction for SWaT attack 10 after adversarial
input optimization. The original attack shown in green spoofs the value of the
flow reported by the sensor FIT401. The adversarial input aimed to cause the
model to predict the values shown in red, but it failed to do so and reached the
significantly different values shown in blue, while deviating from the intended
physical impact significantly.
In addition, if we constrain the level of allowed noise (e.g., to
0.05), the generation of adversarial inputs fails completely in
all of our experiments.
This adversarial robustness of physics-based models stands
out against the background of successes of adversarial learning
in other domains (e.g., image processing). The most likely
reasons for such robust behavior are the various constraints
that the laws of physics, signal continuity, and the underlying
PLC logic impose on the data and on the models. In many areas,
such as autonomous driving, the ability to trust the decision
of neural networks is strongly influenced by the threat that
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the decisions were adversarially manipulated. The results of
our experiments suggest that the proposed anomaly detection
method is resilient to adversarial evasion attacks that represent
a major part of adversarial threats.
Despite the promising results, the data-only approach has
limitations:
• the tests were conducted only on the attacks present in the
dataset; other attacks for which adversarial input could
be created might exist,
• the adversarial input generation relies on the model to
represent the real system accurately, however as the attack
conditions were never present in the training set, the actual
system response might be different from the modeled one.
These limitations can be addressed by performing testing on a
real system, which is a task for future research.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of 1D CNN and
AE-based anomaly and cyber attack detection mechanisms,
answering our research questions as follows.
• Based on our experiments, we conclude that both 1D
CNNs and AEs achieve or exceed the state-of-the-art per-
formance on the three public datasets, while maintaining
generality, simplicity, and a small footprint. It is not clear
whether one of these architectures is always preferable
over another, and we plan to extend our research with
more datasets to investigate this further. In the meantime,
we recommend an ensemble consisting of both models
when possible. If a single model must be chosen, AEs
will likely work out of the box in most cases, while 1D
CNNs will require a round of hyperparameter tuning to
eliminate false positives.
• We discovered that given the proper data preparation
and feature selection, PCA-Reconstruction and windowed-
PCA can provide a simple and efficient detector in many
practical cases. Our recommendation is to first try PCA
as a baseline detector before applying the neural network-
based ones.
• The attack detection method we use allows us to pinpoint
the attack location. However, as spoofing attacks can
trigger a number of changes in the related features, all of
the features will be considered attacked; in such cases, the
attack area will be pinpointed still providing significant
value to the operator. Algorithmic means of distinguishing
between PLC input and output require the integration
of real-time network data, and this is a topic for future
research.
• We found frequency domain analysis helpful in anomaly
and attack detection. Its applicability is subject to a number
of practical limitations; if they are met, frequency domain
analysis can provide strong results.
• The proposed detection method was found to be resilient
to adversarial evasion attacks. This finding is a promising
one as it allows the operators to trust the decisions of the
method. There is a need to confirm these results with real
testbeds. An additional future research direction is a study
of adversarial poisoning attacks on the proposed method.
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